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Abstract
In his “Bridging mainstream and formal ontology”, Augusto (2021) gives an
excellent analysis of Dietrich von Freiberg’s idea of using causality as a par-
titioning principle for upper ontologies. For this Dietrich’s notion of extrinsic
principles is crucial. The question whether causation can and indeed should be
used as a partitioning principle for ontologies is discussed using mathematics
and physics as examples.
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Classical philosophical scholarship is the use of texts from the entire range of our
philosophical tradition as a source to fertilize contemporary thinking. Examples of
this are getting rarer in Western philosophy as analytic philosophy and the idiosyn-
cratic style of its main publishing organs have led many authors to neglect the history
of philosophy before Wittgenstein. This leads to an underutilization of the Western
philosophical tradition, which is regrettable because many of the philosophical prob-
lems we are facing today have been thought through during the history of our culture,
albeit under different contexts. But the continuity of our culture nevertheless enables
us to use them productively.
Augusto’s piece (Augusto, 2021) is an example of this type of classical scholarship.
His aim is to use the ontological work of Dietrich von Freiberg, a disciple of Albertus
Magnus, to show “how a particular medieval text can be (made) relevant to contem-
porary ontology, namely to the effort of constructing, or–perhaps more adequately
put–engineering, upper ontologies” (op. cit., p. 2).
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What makes Dietrich interesting from today’s perspective is that in his work Trac-
tatus de origine rerum praedicamentalium (Treatise on the Origin of the Categories)
(Dietrich von Freiberg, sd/1983) he investigated on what today we can call and up-
per ontology based on causation as a partitioning principle. As Augusto points out,
causation could be used also to partition modern upper ontologies. Indeed, some
domain ontologies have attempted to model causality, for example Rovetto & Mi-
zoguchi (2015), who developed a model of disease causation with causation-related
entities (such as “Causal Structure” or “Causally-linked occurrent”) in combination
with binary causation-predicates ranging over entities such as “Process” or “State”, a
design that makes their ontology unattractive because different approaches to mod-
elling causality compete within it.
But causality is generally not treated at the top level of upper ontologies such as
BFO (Arp et al., 2015) or DOLCE (Borgo & Masolo, 2009). Augusto sees this as a
deficit and sets out to show how Dietrich von Freiberg used causality as a partitioning
principle in his ontological work. Augusto provides the first (thus far missing and of
high utility to the reader not fluent in Latin) translation into English of the first part
of Dietrich’s treatise and extracts an interpretation of Dietrich’s thinking formulated
as an upper ontology represented in a cognitively compelling, modern taxonomic form
(which of course was not used in the 13th century when Dietrich wrote).
The core of Augusto’s analysis shows a partitioning of entities using three types
of causation:
1. extrinsic causes (efficient and final causes in Aristotle, on whom Dietrich, like
all later medieval scholars, heavily bases his thinking; Augusto calls them OUT-
causes);
2. intrinsic causes (material and formal causes in Aristotle, IN-causes for Au-
gusto), and
3. extrinsic principles (OUTIN-causes for Augusto).
The last item on this list is an invention of Dietrich. Augusto describes it as a third
way of causation, “in which [A] something’s principle (so, an IN-cause) is a cause (so,
extrinsic to the entity that is thus originated, or an OUT-cause) with respect to some
other thing, but thanks to which [B] this other thing subsists formally.” Extrinsic
principles, which Augusto calls OUTIN-causes, are for Dietrich “the principles of
cognition in the human mind. So, Dietrich is laying out the path to elaborate on his
view that the human mind can also be a causal origin for an entity” (Augusto, 2021,
p. 17, fn. 27). The OUTIN-causes “are the human mind’s principles for the cognition
of reality, and they are causal with respect to its objects in the sense that the objects
are only insofar as they are known”’ (ibid., p. 28). Thus, OUTIN-causation is not a
relation between or within entities as they are in nature (external reality), but rather
something that is performed by the human mind.
These three principles of causation lead to an (idealistic) partition of entities into
natural and mental entities (ibid., Fig. 9). The former are caused by extrinsic and
intrinsic causes, for example qualities have an extrinsic, while quantities have an
intrinsic causation. For Dietrich, the mental entities are caused by extrinsic principles
(OUTIN-causes) and can be subdivided into first intentions (natural kinds) and second
intentions (universals). Surprisingly, seven of Aristotle’s accidentals (relation, place,
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time, ...) are classified under first intentions, which Augusto highlights by calling this
partition an ‘ontological “bomb”’. Augusto points out that further refinements to the
upper ontology which he derives from Dietrich will be provided with the translation
of the second part of the treatise; but the material available in this paper already
gives us a very good insight into Dietrich’s thinking.
One important question which this paper raises is whether we can really use this
medieval ontology with causation as a partitioning principle for mathematics and
domains strongly rooted in mathematics (such as physics), as Augusto suggests. To
answer this question we would first have to address the following issues.
First of all : Is a partition according to causality necessary in order to distinguish
mathematical ontology from ontologies created for other domains? Certainly, mathe-
matics is distinguished from other sciences by the nature of the entities it deals with,
which are strictly mental in the sense that (1) they have no instances in our natural
environment, and (2) they are given to us only through the processes in the mind of
the mathematician, (3) given to us a priori (they possess an intrinsic intelligibility) as
opposed to entities of external reality (see Reinach, 1989, pp. 145f.). If this essential
nature is seen to be grounded in a special type of causation (mental causation), then
a causality-based partition for mathematical entities can be envisaged. This could
indeed be developed from Dietrich’s framework.
Second : Does causation play a role in mathematics? Traditionally, mathematical
relations are seen to be grounded in essential structures (Wesenszusammenhänge in
the terminology of Reinach, 1989), but have no causative character of their own. A
mathematical proposition which is true given the axioms of a mathematical system
of axioms is an a priori truth, but it seems to be neither caused by anything nor
does it cause anything in the sense of intrinsic or extrinsic causation. But is this
really so? Mathematical models are used to describe many causal relations of na-
ture, namely when applied to physics or other sciences. But the causation-aspect of
mathematical equations used in these sciences arises solely from the interactions of
entities in the systems they describe, not from the mathematical models themselves.
In other words, mathematical models (such as equations) are causation-agnostic. On
the other hand, if the essential structures of mathematics are seen to be caused by
biological structures of our brains, causation can indeed be regarded as the organizing
principle of mathematics. But we do not know how this causation works at the level
of specific mathematical structures such as a circle or a Riemannian manifold, and
so the biological causation of mathematical entities could work only on the level of
very general principles. Therefore, a mature upper ontology of mathematics, work
on which is must less well-developed than in the case of the empirical-inductive and
strongly descriptive sciences such as medicine and biology, would probably not be
organised along causation principles.
Nevertheless, causation is of predominating importance in physics. Which brings
us to the last question:
Third : When we model causation ontologically, for example, in an ontology of
physics, do we have to use it as a partition principle à la Dietrich, or can we model
causation types as types of relations? And if we decide to do the latter, do we
maintain these relations as entities inside the ontology, or do we use the ontology
to enable a controlled discourse about entities in domains where relations such as
causation are expressed in the discourse? Upper ontologists have often decided not to
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model relations ontologically in order to avoid Bradley’s regress (Perovic, 2017). In
mathematics, however, most relations have to be modelled ontologically. For example,
functions are mathematical relations, but also entities in their own right.
Following this line of thought, applications of ontologies both in philosophy–with
the goal of clarifying philosophical arguments in the tradition of analytical philosophy
and neo-positivism–and in software engineering–with the goal of machine-processable
knowledge representation–can use ontologically well-defined entities to which relations
such as causality are then applied. In computer science, this is usually done via the
logical structure of the algorithms which are applied to digital instances of data-
models of reality. It is crucial in this approach to be conscious of (and ideally make
explicit) the nature of the causality that is being modelled.
These brief considerations show that Dietrich’s idea of making causation a parti-
tioning principle for ontologies as presented by Augusto encourages us to rethink how
we structure ontologies. This example underlines the trivial (but in many circles now
forgotten) insight that it is useful for contemporary philosophers to discover alterna-
tive views of the questions arising in their fields developed by philosophers working in
periods of philosophical thinking before Wittgenstein. Augusto’s paper nicely shows
how fruitful such insights can be for today’s philosophical questions.
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